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A New Look at the Interindustry 
Wage Differ  en  t  ials 
Edward E. Leamer and Christopher F.  Thornberg 
2.1  Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical support for the theory 
of effort in a multisector model developed in Leamer (1999). That theory 
is built on the familiar idea that a firm can contract with workers regard- 
ing both the wage level and the working conditions. Those features of the 
labor contract that enhance productivity but are disliked by workers are 
called “effort” and the labor market thus offers a set of wage-effort con- 
tracts with higher wages  offsetting higher effort. If  effort does not affect 
capital depreciation, the high-effort high-wage jobs occur in the capital- 
intensive sectors where the capital cost savings from high effort are greatest. 
Among the implications of this theory are that communities inhabited 
by industrious workers who are willing to exert high effort for high wages 
have high returns to capital, and that minimum wage does not cause un- 
employment-it  forces  effort  in  the  low-effort  low-wage contracts  up 
enough to support the higher wage. These and many other aspects of the 
model of endogenous effort are discussed in Leamer (1 999). In this paper 
we focus on two implications: (1) The capital savings from effort are great- 
est in the capital-intensive sector, which is where the high-wage high-effort 
contracts occur; and (2) price declines in labor-intensive goods twist the 
wage-effort offer curve, lowering the compensation for low-effort work, 
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but increasing the marginal return for hard work. Thus, increased compe- 
tition with the developing economies adversely affects the low-effort work- 
ers who find themselves having to work harder to maintain their standard 
of living; high-effort workers may be made better off by the increased mar- 
ginal compensation for effort in high-wage high-effort jobs in the capital- 
intensive sectors. 
We find empirical support for both of these hypotheses. We  show that 
there is a surprisingly clear relationship among effort, wages, and capital 
intensity, with the higher capital intensity of the sector associated with 
both higher wages and higher effort. We find a twisting of the wage-effort 
offer curve in the 1970s, which we  (somewhat casually) associate with in- 
creased globalization. 
The obvious and possibly insurmountable problem that we  face is how 
to measure effort, the hours of operation multiplied by the intensity of use. 
We have no measurement of job intensity, which is not merely the speed of 
operations, but also the attentiveness and willingness of the worker to take 
risks, and any other intangibles that raise productivity without increasing 
capital costs. Lacking any obvious measure of job intensity, we  take a first 
step in the direction of least resistance and use production workers’ annual 
hours as our indicator of effort. We are thereby acting as if intensity is not 
so negatively correlated with hours that there is no relationship between 
hours and effort. 
Given the measurement difficulties, we should not expect much. The big 
surprise  is that  there  is  a  remarkably  clear  relationship  among hours, 
wages, and capital intensity. The capital-intensive sectors have longer an- 
nual hours and higher hourly wage rates, exactly what the theory would 
suggest if hours were a perfect indicator of effort. Not only do we  find a 
wage-effort offer curve; we also find it shifting just as the theory suggests. 
In the 1960s, with stable relative prices but improving technologies, the 
curve shifts upward with higher real wages offered at every level of effort. 
Starting in the mid-l970s, when the relative prices of apparel and footwear 
and textiles and other labor-intensive goods fell substantially, the offer 
curve twists, with wages falling for low-effort contracts, but rising for high- 
effort contracts. In the 198Os, the curve began shifting to the right, with 
more hours required to attain any given level of earnings. The theory al- 
lows this last shift to be due either to the introduction of new machinery 
(computers) or to a rise in fixed costs other than capital, namely benefits. 
The relationship between wages and capital intensity has been discussed 
in the efficiency wage literature, including papers by  Dickens and Katz 
(1987), Katz and Summers (1989), and Krueger and Summers (1987). We 
view the correlation between wages and capital intensity through an entirely 
different theoretical lens. Empirically, the innovation of this paper is the 
discovery of a strong correlation  between weekly hours and capital in- 
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One surprising feature of the U.S. wage-effort offer curve is that it bends 
backward in the early years of the sample, with the highest wages offered 
in sectors with relatively low effort (as measured by hours). The two-digit- 
level names of these unusual sectors are transportation, primary metals, 
and printing and publishing. These names indicate to us union effects. A 
union effect on wages can come from market power in the product market, 
since it allows producers to pass on higher costs to consumers who have 
nowhere else to go. Beginning in the 1970s, consumers did have somewhere 
else to go: auto imports from Japan and steel imports from a variety of 
countries. The erosion of  union power seems evident in  the wage-effort 
offer curve as the transportation and primary metal sectors increase their 
hours to conform more closely to the wage-hour contracts offered in other 
sectors. But our measure of unionization is not able to account completely 
for this backward-bending portion of the wage-effort offer curve. This may 
be due to the poor quality of the unionization data. 
The  most  likely  alternative explanation  for  the  correlation  between 
wages and capital intensity is the complementarity of human and physical 
capital. We include measures of human capital as well as rate of unioniza- 
tion in our equations that explain wages  and hours.  Unionization and 
education both have positive simple correlations with weekly wages and 
weekly hours. Controlling for capital intensity of the sector, both educa- 
tion and union membership have a positive and statistically significant 
effect on wages, but do not have a measurable effect on hours. Even after 
controlling for education and unionization, there remains strong evidence 
of the positive relationship between wages and effort that we are looking for. 
Another possible explanation for the apparent wage-effort offer curve 
is rent sharing, with rents especially high in capital-intensive sectors. We 
explore this possibility by  using an imperfect measure of industry rents 
and do not find that rents can explain away our findings. 
Our analysis could be contaminated by business-cycle effects. The first 
response to a slowdown in sales is a reduction in  hours, and only when 
the slowdown is judged to be long-lived is there a reduction in employ- 
ment. Then when sales begin to grow again, the first response is to increase 
hours, followed later by an increase in employment. The variation in em- 
ployment causes opposite variation in capital per worker because capital 
is a very  slow moving series. This cycle in hours and capital per worker 
causes us concern about our choice of years for estimating the wage-effort 
offer curve, since the movements in the curve over time may be mostly due 
to the cycle. We  control for the cycle by  estimating the wage-effort offer 
curve at business-cycle peaks and business-cycle troughs and then com- 
paring peak with peak and trough with trough. 
The theory that drives the data analysis concerns the demand for labor, 
but the market, of course, has to have a supply side as well. We  briefly 
explore one labor-supply variable, gender. We find what is already rather 40  Edward E. Learner and Christopher F.  Thornberg 
well  known: Females are more likely to be employed in low-effort low- 
wage sectors. 
In section  2.2, we  review pertinent  aspects of  the theory  offered in 
Learner (1999). Also in section 2.2, we  summarize the related literature. 
We argue that we offer a unique theoretical viewpoint that is distinct from 
the efficiency-wage literature and that leads us to derive an entirely new 
equation that explains hours as a function of the capital intensity of the 
sector. In section 2.3 we discuss graphical displays of the two-digit Stan- 
dard Industrial Classification (SIC) data on hours and wages. These dis- 
plays conform remarkably well with the theory. The capital-intensive sec- 
tors have long hours and high hourly wage rates. We also present a formal 
analysis at the four-digit level that backs up what is evident in the two- 
digit displays. Finally, we offer some summary and concluding remarks in 
section 2.4. 
2.2  Theoretical Two-Sector Model 
This section reviews Learner’s (1999) two-sector model with endogenous 
effort. The key building block is a production function defined as 
where Q is the rate of output per unit of time, K and L are the (timeless) 
stocks of capital and labor inputs respectively,f(.;)  is a function homoge- 
neous to degree one, s is the intensity of operation, h is the hours of opera- 
tion, and e = s *  h is the overall effort exerted by each worker. Intensity is 
influenced by  speed of operations, but also includes the level of care or 
attentiveness a worker must exert to reduce the likelihood of breakdowns 
and other costly delays in the production process. 
We make two additional assumptions about effort. First, we assume that 
labor cares about effort, but capital does not. In other words, long hours 
at high speed will not wear out equipment any faster than short hours at 
slow speed. Second, we  assume that effort is continuous and completely 
variable, which is an assumption that affects the details but not the basic 
message of the model.’ For generating most of the diagrams, we  assume 
that each sector has fixed input technologies and the production function 
takes the form 
1. There is a substantial literature built on the assumption that capital does care-that 
increased use causes increased depreciation. A recent working paper by Auernheimer and 
Rumbos (1996) includes many references, among them Calvo (1975) and Bischoff and Kok- 
kelenberg (1987). This literature typically uses a one-sector model and focuses on intertem- 
poral capital use questions. This paper, instead, emphasizes sectoral differences. Deardorff 
and Stafford (1976) provide another framework that allows both capital and labor to care 
about the pace and hours of  operation. They write output proportional to the hours of 
operation and explore the coordination problem between two inputs that have different pref- 
erences regarding hours of work. A New  Look at the Interindustry Wage  Differentials  41 
where et is the effort level in sector i, and K and L are the capital and labor 
inputs. With the assumption that depreciation does not depend on worker 
effort, a competitive labor market will award any marginal increase in out- 
put from greater effort to the workers. Expressed differently, it is as if the 
workers rented the capital equipment and received the excess earnings as 
compensation for the effort they decide to exert. The (net) wage rate w,(e,) 
applicable to effort e can be found from the zero-profit condition p,  e, . 
f(K,L)  = w,(e,>  *  L = r .  K,  where r is the rental rate of capital andpl  is the 
price of the product.* Inserting the labor and capital inputs and output 
levels into the zero-profit condition and dividing by  total output deter- 
mines the set of zero-profit wage-effort contracts in sector i, 
(3) 
where P  is an overall price index. The wage-effort zero-profit lines for two 
sectors are illustrated in figure 2.1. 
Both zero-profit lines in figure 2.1 have negative intercepts, since at very 
low levels of effort the value of the output is not large enough to cover 
capital rental costs. Since the capital costs in the capital-intensive sector 
are higher, the intercept is more negative. As the effort increases, workers 
can be awarded higher wages in both sector~.~  The observed labor con- 
tracts will lie along the upper envelope of these wage-effort offer curves, 
highlighted as the heavy curve depicted in figure 2.1. The marginal return 
to effort has to be lower in the labor-intensive sector, since otherwise there 
would be no attractive contracts in the capital-intensive sector. These in- 
tercepts  and  slopes dictate that  the  low-effort low-wage contracts  are 
offered in the labor-intensive sector while high-wage high-effort contracts 
are offered in the capital-intensive sector. Also depicted in figure 2.1 is an 
indifference curve tangent to the wage-effort offer curve at two points. 
This represents an equilibrium with identical workers who are indifferent 
between the two prevailing contracts, high-effort high-wage and low-effort 
low-wage. 
High effort saves capital costs. These savings are offset by the wage pre- 
miums necessary to compensate workers for high levels of effort. Multiple 
2. Note that the rental rate of capital could also be considered to include depreciation ex- 
penses. 
3. Average capital cost is AC, = (r . K)/(y . e),  where q is the level of output when e = 1. 
The capital cost savings of effort is dAC,/de  = -(r .  K)/(q  . s),  clearly larger at any one 
specific level of effort e for industries with a greater overall capital cost per worker. These 
cost savings are offset by the marginal increase in wages necessary to compensate workers' 
for their additional efforts. 42  Edward E. Learner and Christopher F. Thornberg 
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Fig. 2.1  Equilibrium in a two-sector model with fixed input technologies 
shifts and other forms of capital sharing can also save capital costs. When 
two workers share the same capital, the intercept of the zero-profit line 
for each worker shifts upward toward the origin by  a factor of two. This 
allows firms to offer better wage-effort contracts. But capital sharing does 
not come without costs. Among the costs of capital sharing are wage pre- 
mia for the second and graveyard shifts, transitional downtimes, and in- 
creased noncapital fixed costs, such as training and benefits, as well  as 
moral hazard problems and coordination costs. Competition among firms 
will lead to efficient work practices that optimally trade off the gains from 
capital sharing with the costs. 
2.2.1 
If  the capital/labor ratio in  a sector is  not fixed  technologically, the 
wage-effort offer curve loses its flat segments, but otherwise there is no 
material change in the model. For example, a Cobb-Douglas production 
function is 
(4)  q  =  e.kP, 
where q is output per worker, k is the capital used by each worker, and p 
is the capital intensity. The optimal level of capital is determined by setting 
the marginal revenue product of capital equal to the capital rental rate r. 
Endogenous Effort with Cobb-Douglas Technologies 
(5) 
Since capital’s marginal rate of  productivity changes with  the level  of 
effort, the optimal level of  capital inputs varies with the level of effort. A New Look at the Interindustry Wage Differentials  43 
Substituting equation (4) for q and (5) for k in the zero-profit condition, 
w =  p  *  q -  Y  *  k,  we find that the sector wage-effort offer curve becomes 
w  =  p-P)  . ew-13)  . Y+/(I-P)  . (PPI(1-P)  - pl/c'-P,)  (6) 
This sets wage offers proportional  to effort raised to a power that ex- 
ceeds one and that increases with the capital intensity of the sector. A two- 
sector equilibrium with Cobb-Douglas production functions is displayed 
in figure 2.2. It is very similar to the equilibrium in figure 2.1. In fact, it is 
easy to demonstrate that if the line tangent to the offer curves was traced 
back to the y-axis, the intercept would be the negative cost of capital, Y . k. 
2.2.2  Changes in Product Prices 
A change in the relative price in the two sectors twists the wage-effort 
offer curve. Figure 2.3 depicts the initial effect of a simultaneous rise in pz 
and fall in pI that leaves the overall price level P  constant. What this does 
is rotate upward the wage-effort offer line in the capital-intensive sector 
and rotate downward the wage-effort offer line in the labor-intensive sec- 
tor. These changes render the low-effort low-wage contract in the labor- 
intensive sector less attractive and cause income and substitution effects 
in opposite directions for the two contracts. The high-wage workers expe- 
rience a favorable income effect and a substitution effect in favor of higher 
effort (steeper wage-effort offer line). The low-wage workers experience an 
unfavorable income effect and a substitution effect in favor of lower effort. 
With identical workers, this cannot be an equilibrium because capital 
constraints do not allow all workers to operate in the preferred capital- 
intensive sector. An increase in the capital-rental rate would be needed to 
ration the consequent excess demand for capital. This rise in the rental 
rate of capital shifts both wage-effort offer lines downward. Both the initial 
Fig. 2.2  Wage-effort offer curve with Cobb-Douglas production function 44  Edward E. Learner and Christopher F. Thornberg 
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Fig. 2.3  Initial effect of a rise in the relative price of the capital-intensive tradable 
rotation and the shift downward worsen the terms of the low-wage low- 
effort contract, and it follows that  the final equilibrium selects a lower 
worker-indifference curve for the representative worker. The negative in- 
come effect that shifts the contracts to a lower indifference curve will also 
cause lower wages and higher effort in both sectors, provided that both 
leisure and consumption goods are normal. There is also a substitution 
effect that  tends to drive the contracts in opposite directions; the low- 
effort low-wage contract shifts in favor of lower effort and lower wages, 
and the high-effort high-wage contract shifts in favor of higher wages and 
higher effort. Thus a rise in the relative price of the capital-intensive good 
makes workers worse off and increases income inequality. Keep in mind 
that the workers are indifferent between the two contracts and there is no 
real inequality in the model. The principal message is that the wage-effort 
offer curve twists, as shown in figure 2.4, We find this kind of twisting in 
the 1970s. 
2.2.3  Heterogeneous Workers 
The model presented here can easily be amended to allow for variation 
in workers' attitudes toward effort. This change has little impact on our 
empirical work, since we are studying the demand side of the labor market 
wage-effort offer curve, not the choices that workers make from among the 
offered contracts. In a model with heterogeneous preferences, materialistic 
workers who have a relative preference for goods over leisure would take 
the high-effort high-wage jobs, while humanistic workers who prefer lei- 
sure would take the low-effort low-wage work.  Heterogeneity  in  labor A New  Look at the Interindustry Wage Differentials  45 
Fig. 2.4  Twisting of the market wage-effort offer curve (market response to 
relative price change) 
supply does not affect how we study the demand side of the market very 
much, but this form of heterogeneity is important from a policy stand- 
point. The twisting of  the offer curve caused by  declines in the relative 
price of labor-intensive goods may have an adverse affect on the utility 
level of the humanists, but a favorable effect on the materialists. In other 
words, the welfare effects of changes in economic fundamentals such as 
relative prices may vary across groups of workers. 
However, heterogeneity in ability is a serious problem for our empirical 
analysis. If the ability to operate expensive machinery varies across indi- 
viduals, it is possible to have the more-able workers receiving high wages 
for low effort in the capital-intensive sectors, while the less-able workers 
work hard for low pay in the labor-intensive sectors. This would seriously 
affect our attempts to uncover the offer curve from observed contracts. 
We partially allow for this by including in the empirical analysis measures 
of education. 
2.2.4  Technological Change 
This  subsection  discusses the effect of  technological  change  on the 
wage-effort offer curve. The debate regarding the increase in inequality in 
the United States has focused on two culprits, globalization and techno- 
logical change. We have shown that globalization, taking the form of price 
declines for labor-intensive goods, twists the wage-effort offer curve. It is 
an unfortunate but familiar outcome that technological change can have 
almost the same effect. We would have liked in this paper to have made a 
substantial effort to disentangle technological effects from globalization 
effects, but  that  task  requires  direct  indicators  of  both  technological 46  Edward E. Learner and Christopher F.  Thornberg 
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Fig. 2.5  Effect of technological change on wage-effort offer curve 
change and globalization. When we  occasionally slip into interpreting a 
certain twist of the wage-effort offer curve as a globalization effect or a 
technological effect, we  do so loosely and based on information not con- 
tained in this paper. 
Figure 2.5 depicts an initial wage-effort offer curve and the first changes A New Look at the Interindustry Wage Differentials  47 
that are induced by  three distinct kinds of technological change in the 
capital-intensive sector: a reduction in the rental cost of existing equip- 
ment, the introduction of new, more costly equipment, and learning by do- 
ing. A reduction in the rental cost of the existing equipment simply shifts 
the intercept upward of the wage-effort offer line applicable to the capital- 
intensive sector, as indicated by  the positioning  of the new wage-effort 
offer line (the dashed black line). New more costly equipment creates a 
new wage-effort offer line that has a lower intercept but a steeper slope- 
meaning that the rental cost of the equipment is greater, but the productiv- 
ity is higher. Learning by doing does not affect the rental cost, but it in- 
creases the productivity. Thus the intercept stays the same, but the slope 
increases. 
These first effects of new technology create better jobs in the capital- 
intensive sector, and the economy in each case would have to experience 
an increase in the capital-rental rates (interest rate) to ration the capital 
and encourage workers to stick with jobs in the labor-intensive sector. This 
is the usual general equilibrium story. Capital is helped or hurt depending 
on whether the technological change is in the capital or labor-intensive 
sector. Unlike the usual case, labor here has a mixed experience. Before the 
rental rate of capital is bid up, each of the figures shows an improvement in 
the high-wage high-effort contracts. When the rental rate of capital is bid 
up to equilibrate  the capital market,  the wage-effort offer curve  shifts 
downward across the board. This means that the low-effort low-wage con- 
tracts are definitely hurt by  whatever kind of technological change may 
occur in the capital-intensive sector; but it is possible, depending on labor- 
supply elasticities, to have net improvement in the highest-wage highest- 
effort jobs remaining in the final equilibrium. 
Unfortunately,  the twisting of  the wage-effort offer curve  associated 
with technological change is essentially the same as the twisting associated 
with globalization. Thus we will not get very far trying to sort trade from 
technology by studying only the offer curve. 
2.2.5  Previous Literature 
There is a substantial previous literature on hours and wages. Unlike 
this paper, which explores the demand side, much of the discussion of 
hours in labor economics is concerned with the supply side-the  worker’s 
choice of hours. The budget constraint that is often assumed to face work- 
ers has earnings proportional to hours worked. An exception is Oi (1962), 
who assumes that firms experience a fixed training cost for each employee 
hired. The fixed costs that we emphasize are not training costs, but capital- 
rental charges. Another fixed cost that has recently increased in impor- 
tance is worker benefits paid on a per-worker basis instead of a per-hour 
basis. Of course, nothing theoretically hinges on what the fixed costs are- 
the message of the model is that both hours and hourly wage rates should 
be greater the greater the fixed costs. 48  Edward E. Leamer and Christopher F.  Thornberg 
Fig. 2.6  Labor-demand functions in previous literature 
Barzel (1973) adds another curved portion  to the budget constraint, 
based on the assumption that labor productivity falls as the number of 
working hours increases within a fixed period of time, leading to the re- 
versed S-shaped budget constraint cited in such empirical work as Moffit 
(1984). Barzel’s and Oi’s budget curves are displayed in figure 2.6. 
There has been a substantial amount of empirical work in this field, 
although again most of this work has been more concerned with labor 
supply than labor demand. Rosen (1969) was one of the first to investigate 
the interindustry relationship between wages and hours. His reasoning of 
the apparent wage-hour trade-off was neatly summarized in his introduc- 
tion: “Hours of work are an important non-pecuniary aspect of employ- 
ment, even though ‘industry’ per se is not. On the other hand, wage and 
hour differences can persist because firms find certain attributes of their 
employees more productive and desirable than others and are willing to 
incur extra costs to obtain them” (250). He divides his analysis into supply 
and demand sides. On the demand side he, like Oi, correlates hours with 
the fixed costs of employing labor, including hiring costs, specific training, 
and unemployment-insurance premiums above the minimum levels. The 
demand for hours per employee is a decreasing function of the wage rate 
and an increasing function of  these fixed costs. While he has no direct 
measure of these fixed costs across the industries in his sample, he derives 
what he believes to be suitable industry proxies from a number of demo- 
graphic variables including age, education, and race. No mention of capi- 
tal intensity is included in his work. He also considers short-run adjust- 
ments by including a variable to measure the sectoral growth rate and also 
other external effects, including unions. In general, he has more success 
measuring the demand side of the equation than the supply side. A New Look at the Interindustry Wage Differentials  49 
On the labor-supply side are papers by Moffit (1984), Lundberg (1985), 
and Biddle and Zarkin (1989). These are primarily concerned with identi- 
fying the factors that influence the hours worked by  individual workers, 
and the relationship between hours and wages as measured from the work- 
er’s perspective. They all point out that traditional ordinary least squares 
(OLS) wage regressions, which include hours worked as a right-hand-side 
variable, will not adequately measure the wage-hour relationship because 
of the endogeneity of hours. Biddle and Zarkin specifically control for this 
endogeneity and find the bias to be significant. After controlling for this 
bias, they find that male wages increase as a function of hours, first at an 
increasing and then at a decreasing rate. Less in line with our work are 
papers on the intertemporal behavior of hours and earnings, such as Ber- 
nanke (1986) and Abowd and Card (1987, 1989). These papers are con- 
cerned again with the supply side. Abowd and Card consider how individ- 
uals alter their hours of work over time. Bernanke is  interested in  how 
earnings and hours varied in eight industries during the Great Depression. 
The efficiency-wage literature has some elements of similarity with our 
approach, but the differences are substantial and important. Our key vari- 
able is the capital intensity of the task-the  greater the capital intensity, 
the greater the effort exerted by  the worker. Most of the efficiency-wage 
theory initiated by  Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and collected in  Akerlof 
and Yellen (1986) makes no reference at all to the capital intensity of the 
operation. These efficiency-wage  models are all based on the idea that firms 
can increase profits by raising wages above the market clearing price. These 
above-market  wages reduce monitoring costs, since workers are induced to 
provide high effort by the threat of termination and thus a wage reduction. 
The efficiency-wage conceptual framework is very different from ours. 
After controlling for ability, our framework has workers either preferring 
their own job or indifferent between their wage-effort contract and those 
contracts available to them in other jobs. The efficiency-wage theory, on 
the other hand, suggests that high wages reflect worker rents needed to 
coerce workers in the good jobs not to shirk. According to the efficiency- 
wage theory, workers in low-wage jobs prefer and are able to do the high- 
wage work, but are prevented from bidding for the better jobs in order to 
make the threat of firing have force in the high-wage contracts. Another 
important difference is that our framework has high-effort jobs in capital- 
intensive  sectors and  low-effort jobs  in  labor-intensive sectors. In  the 
efficiency-wage  literature, worker effort need not vary across sectors. There 
can be a high-effort low-wage perfectly monitored job and a high-effort 
high-wage imperfectly monitored job. 
Empirically, the efficiency-wage literature includes one of our two fun- 
damental  equations, but  not  the  other. Our  framework explains both 
wages  and hours as a function of capital intensity. The first equation is 
part  of  the  efficiency-wage tradition;  the  second  is  not.  Indeed,  the 50  Edward E. Learner and Christopher F.  Thornberg 
efficiency-wage literature was partly instigated by  the observation of the 
substantial differences in wages across industries. The correlation of the 
industry premiums with capital intensity was noted at least as far back as 
Slichter (1950). This has been empirically investigated in recent years in pa- 
pers by Dickens and Katz (1987), Katz and Summers (1989), and Krueger 
and Summers (1987). The interindustry wage pattern has been shown to 
be steady over time and remarkably consistent across different countries. 
The wage premiums in the capital-intensive sectors have been attributed 
to variety of potential causes, including higher costs of monitoring, more 
inelastic labor demand, and higher cost of worker shirking (close in spirit 
to our own work). It has been noted that disentangling these various ef- 
fects can be difficult because of the simultaneity problem, since wages and 
capital intensity are considered to be jointly determined. 
The new  empirical finding in  this paper is not the well-known corre- 
lation  between wages  and capital  intensity, but  rather  the  correlation 
between weekly hours and capital intensity. This correlation may either 
contradict, be explained by,  or complement the efficiency-wage findings, 
depending on other assumptions. First, consider the contradiction. The 
efficiency-wage literature generally assumes that weekly hours are fixed 
and that intensity of effort is variable and costly to observe. But if hours 
of work are variable and if workers prefer fewer hours, then an efficiency 
contract  can stipulate  both  a  higher  hourly  wage  rate  and also  fewer 
weekly hours than the prevailing market contract. This would make us 
expect a negative correlation between hours and wage rates. 
If, instead, employers are indifferent to the number of hours worked by 
each individual employee per week  (monitoring problems, but no fixed 
costs), then the relationship  between hours and capital intensity could 
merely be a secondary labor-supply effect caused by the high hourly wages 
offered in  capital-intensive  sectors. Workers rationally  choose  to work 
more weekly hours because of the higher opportunity cost of leisure. This 
view,  of  course, requires the additional assumption that substitution ef- 
fects outweigh income effects. 
Our  findings could  also  complement  the  efficiency-wage literature. 
Some monitoring costs are like capital costs in that they are paid  per 
worker rather than per hour. Others may be subject to learning curves and 
other economies of scale. Then our theory suggests that industries that 
incur high monitoring costs would also require their workers to exert addi- 
tional effort. Thus, the interindustry wage differential would be part wage 
premium, part compensation for higher effort. 
Distinguishing between these possibilities is not necessary for our pur- 
poses and is clearly outside the scope of this paper. Our whole approach 
of tracing out the wage-effort offer curve at different times and connecting 
its movements to changes in product prices, technology, and worker bene- 
fits represents a substantial departure from the efficiency-wage literature. A New Look at the Interindustry Wage Differentials  51 
This comes from the very  different conceptual frameworks that underlie 
wages  that are determined to solve monitoring problems as opposed to 
wages that are instead payment for observable effort. 
2.3  Empirical Evidence from the Census of Manufactures 
The theory of effort can explain a large number of empirical facts, in- 
cluding wage differences across industries, productivity differences across 
countries, and the limited capital flow  from high-wage to low-wage re- 
gions. The purpose of this paper is to breathe more life into this theory by 
showing that the U.S. labor market does seem to have a wage-effort offer 
curve. Two  data sets are employed to this purpose, industry-level data 
from the Bartelsman-Becker-Gray Manufacturing Productivity database 
(hereafter NBER)4  and worker-level data from the March Current Popula- 
tion Surveys (CPS).5  We  will  assume initially that all workers are identi- 
cally productive and that  there is  a single wage-effort offer curve with 
higher wages compensating for higher effort levels. This wage-effort offer 
curve is indexed by  the capital intensity of the sector, with the high-effort 
high-wage contracts occurring in the capital-intensive sectors. Workers 
may have the same tastes and therefore be indifferent among the wage- 
effort contracts that are formed, or workers may have different attitudes 
toward effort, with the industrious (or materialistic) choosing high-effort 
high-wage contracts and with the slothful (or humanistic) workers choos- 
ing low-effort low-wage  jobs. Later we will allow ability differences proxied 
by  education levels. 
The measurement of intensity of effort is the biggest problem we  face. 
Effort is  the product  of  unobservable intensity times observable hours. 
Fortunately, since effort is  our dependent variable, measurement errors 
cause noise but not bias. Although we  suspect that hours and intensity of 
work are positively correlated, it is enough that they are not so negatively 
correlated as to destroy any positive association between effort and hours. 
Capital sharing from shift or temp work might cause us serious diffi- 
culties, but it does not. If the same capital K is used by two different work- 
4.  The NBER Manufacturing Productivity database, constructed by  Eric Bartelsman and 
Wayne Gray, contains annual information on 450 manufacturing industries from  1958 to 
1991. The industries are those defined in the 1972 Standard Industrial Classification and 
cover the entire manufacturing sector. The data themselves come from various government 
data sources, with many of the variables taken directly from the Census Bureau’s Annual 
Survey of Manufactures and Census of Manufactures. The advantages of using the NBER 
database are that it gathers together many years of data, adjusts for changes in industry 
definitions over time, and links in a few additional key variables (e.g., price deflators and 
capital stock). For more information, see the NBER website: www.nber.org. 
5. The sample represented  in the Current Population  Survey March demographic data 
was further reduced to those workers who worked between 20 and 80 hours in the previous 
week, who made at least $2.50 per hour in 1987 dollars, who were between the ages of  17 
and 75, and who were not self-employed. 52  Edward E. Learner and Christopher F.  Thornberg 
ers over the course of a day, then our measure of the capital intensity of 
the job correctly is equal to K/2, since 2 is the number of employees. Like- 
wise, if one worker uses the equipment K for half the year, and another 
uses it for the other half, then the annual rental cost is also proportional 
to Kl2, which we appropriately measure because the number of employees 
is doubled. Thus both shift work and temp work are compatible with our 
theory and with our empirical work. What we  do not allow for are setup 
times associated with the handing of the capital from one worker to the 
next. Nor do we  allow for unused capacity that is not charged against 
labor. But we think both of these are relatively minor concerns. 
2.3.1  Evidence of the Wage-Effort Trade-off from 
Two-Digit Manufacturing Data 
Given the potential problems with the use of hours as a measure  of 
effort, it is perhaps remarkable that we are able to find a clear relationship 
across manufacturing industries  between the average number  of  hours 
worked per week and hourly wages. Figure 2.7 depicts two-digit SIC data 
on industry average weekly hours and industry average weekly wages for 
production workers at six periods of time between 1950 and 1995. All six 
scatter diagrams have a remarkably clear association between hours and 
wages, exactly what we are looking for, with printing and publishing being 
the one outlier, offering a low-hour high-wage contract. Of course it is not 
surprising that people who work more hours earn more, but figure 2.7 has 
the increase in wages more than proportional to the average weekly hours, 
which we take as a reward for saving capital costs. These first data displays 
leave us excited about the accuracy of  the theory. Low-wage low-effort 
contracts are being offered in the labor-intensive industries such as apparel 
and leather, while high-wage high-effort contracts are being offered in the 
capital-intensive sectors such as transport and chemicals. 
Another  interesting feature  of the data displayed in  figure 2.7  is the 
backward bend in the early periods, which is ironed out by 1980. The bend 
is associated with transportation and primary  metals, which offer high 
wages but lower hours than some of the other sectors. Printing and pub- 
lishing is on the backward-bending part of the curve in 1950, but separates 
entirely from the rest of the curve thereafter. We  are inclined to think 
that the backward-bending part of the curve is due to unionization effects. 
Production workers in transport and primary metals have unionization 
rates of over 55 percent, compared to a 30 percent  overall unionization 
rate for production workers in manufacturing industries6 But printing has 
6.  These numbers were calculated from the Current Population Surveys and refer to union- 
ization rates in the 1990s. There is every reason to believe that the patterns of unionization, 
if not the overall numbers, have been roughly constant over time. 1950 
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a unionization rate of only 14 per~ent.~  It may be that printing of news- 
papers requires intense worker effort during relatively few hours in a day. 
Textiles is another unusual sector. Textiles in 1970 and earlier had many 
more hours but about the same wages as apparel and leather. Relatively 
high-wage growth in textiles has moved the textile point closer to the rest of 
the scatter. This change has been accompanied by an increase in the average 
number of hours worked per week by production workers in this sector. 
2.3.2  Trends and Cycles in Hours and Employment 
We are concerned that some of these shifts in the wage-effort offer curve 
may be associated with the business cycle. The unit of time to which the 
wage-effort offer curve applies is the implicit contract period, which may 
be a worker’s lifetime and which almost certainly covers the business cycle. 
If a business cycle defines the time unit, then the capital/labor ratio should 
be the capital stock divided by peak employment. In addition, both earn- 
ings and hours should refer to the whole cycle, not to a subset of time 
within a cycle. When we use annual data, the measured capital intensity is 
inappropriately high at the trough of the cycle when employment is low. 
When we  use annual data we  overestimate the effort level and the wages 
since we  do not account for the idleness of workers at the trough. For 
these reasons, we  worry that when we  trace out the apparent wage-effort 
offer curve over time we may think that we see shifting offers when all that 
is happening is a business cycle. 
Figure 2.8 shows how closely the employment rate and average weekly 
hours move together  over time, with hours worked leading the cycle in 
employment.* Average hours peaked at over 41 hours in the late 1960s 
when unemployment was down to less than 4 percent. Average hours bot- 
tomed  out at slightly over 39  hours in the late  1950s and again in the 
early 1980s when unemployment rates were measured at 7 percent and 10 
percent, respectively9 
We note the run-up in average hours in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
to peak levels and the corresponding increase in the rate of employment 
7. The most unionized sector inside the printing sector is newspaper publishing, with a 
unionization  rate of  30  percent. It is  unlikely that disaggregation is going to resolve this 
puzzle. 
8. Data collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The employment rate is mea- 
sured as l -  Unemployment Rate. Weekly hours are measured for production workers. 
9. It is worth noting the distinct difference between average weekly hours as collected in 
the NBER Productivity database and the data presented here, with the BLS calculating aver- 
age weekly hours at about 1 hour more than the NBER data. The BLS data were collected 
from the Current Population Surveys, while the NBER data were collected from the Census 
of Manufactures.  The primary difference between these two data sets is their ultimate source, 
firms for the Census of Manufacturers and individual respondents for the Current Popula- 
tion Surveys. In the CPS, the data on hours employed per week include those employed at 
all jobs. Thus the average is dragged up by the set of individuals who take employment at 
more than one firm as well as by  recollection error. A New Look at the Interindustry Wage Differentials  55 
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Fig. 2.8  Average employment rates and hours, production workers 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
to high levels, but not to the historically high levels seen in the mid-1960s. 
This seems to imply that there has been some distinct break between these 
two series occurring in the early 1980s. We find this increase to be endemic 
across all industries in the NBER data. We  are inclined to attribute this 
to a reaction to an increase in benefits, which are paid on a per-worker 
basis, not on a per-hour basis. Firms thus save on the costs of benefits by 
increasing hours. But the introduction of new, very expensive equipment 
can have a similar effect. 
Cycles and trends are eliminated by subtracting the overall average from 
the sectoral hours data displayed in figure 2.9. The high-hours sectors in 
1993 are displayed in panel A and the low-hours sectors in panel B. For 
example, a worker in apparel (in fig. 2.9B) worked about 4 hours less than 
the average production worker. This value has remained steady over the 
45 years mapped out in the figure. On the top is the paper industry, where 
a worker works about 2.5 more hours per week than the average produc- 
tion worker. Notable exceptions to the stability of these results are indi- 
cated by thick black lines. They include, especially, transport and primary 
metals, each of which experienced an increase in average hours of about 
3 hours per week. These two industries were the same two that formed the 
backward-bending portion of the wage-effort offer curve in the 1970s. The 
increase in the number of hours in these two industries is clearly due to 
the same reason the backward-bending portion of the wage-effort curve 
disappeared  from the  data, that  is,  the decline of  unionization. Those 
changing in the opposite direction, albeit on a smaller scale, include furni- 
ture and food, which both experienced a 2-hour decline. The food sector 








m-tt-omwmmnm-teon  wnnnwwwwt-ecmmmmm 
+PAPER  L  MACHINERY  +CHEMICALS  -TRANSPORT 









m-wt-omwmmwm-~t-Om  tnnn~wwwt-t-t-mmmmm 
-FURNITURE  +LUMBER  -L  MIX  MANUFACT 
-FOOD  -L  ELECTRICAL  +TEXTILE 
+PRINTING  A  LEATHER  +APPAREL 
Fig. 2.9  Smoothed variation in two-digit industry hours from manufacturing 
mean: (A)  high-hours sectors, (B)  low-hours sectors 
Source:  Citibase database. A New Look at the Interindustry Wage Differentials  57 
intensity compared to other manufacturing industries, perhaps explaining 
the decline in the average number of weekly hours worked in this industry. 
2.3.3  Displays of the 1990 Four-Digit Industry Data 
The four-digit industry data in the NBER Productivity database are con- 
siderably more noisy than the two-digit data, but the same pattern emerges. 
Capital-intensive sectors pay high wages and have long hours. Figure 2.10 
shows the distinctly positive relationship between average weekly hours 
and average real weekly wages for production workers across the indus- 
tries included in the NBER data in 1990.'" Also striking is the strong posi- 
tive relationship between the capital intensity of the sector, with both aver- 
age hours worked per week by production workers and weekly wages. Of 
these two, the relationship between capital and hours is noisier. This is 
probably due to short-term fluctuations in industry demand that are ab- 
sorbed more by  hours than by  wages, as well  as due to the existence of 
greater noise in reported hours than in reported weekly earnings. 
We  expect a positive relationship to exist between weekly hours and 
weekly  wages in  the short run  due to the inelasticity  of  the industry- 
specific labor supply and normal fluctuations in relative industry demand. 
This could explain the upward-sloping relationship seen in any one year. 
Yet  as seen in the two-digit data, the pattern of wages and hours across 
sectors is very stable over time. For example, the correlation of weekly 
wages across sectors between 1990 and 1960 is 0.83, as can be seen in table 
2.1. The table reports the cross-industry correlations of wages and hours 
at the various sample years, and both remarkably stable even over a 30- 
year time period. The correlation of weekly hours across sectors in 1960 
and 1990 is 0.56. 
Some of the association between hourly wages and weekly hours may 
come from the institutionalized 40-hour workweek and the legal require- 
ment for overtime pay rates for weekly hours beyond 40. But legally man- 
dated overtime need not have any effect even when overtime is observed. 
If  a firm is willing to pay $430 for 42 hours of work, the contract can 
stipulate 42  hours at $430142 per hour, or, to comply with the law, the 
contract can stipulate an hourly rate of $10 with time and a half for over- 
10. The data have been smoothed using a three-period weighted average over the time 
series provided in the NBER data, where the weight is the percentage variation from the 3- 
year median. The reason we  use this particular  method  is  because the hours data in the 
NBER data are subject to what would appear to be unreasonable fluctuations in hours per 
production  worker and hourly wages.  Often hourly wages will increase by  50 percent or 
more, while hours worked per worker drop by  50 percent. This almost certainly is due to 
basic errors in the recording of the data. Using the deviation from the median as a weight 
eliminates the effect of large outliers in the data. It represents between 12 and 14 million 
production workers separated into 448 distinct manufacturing industries. Only production 
workers are discussed here because unfortunately data on the average hours per week  for 
nonproduction workers are not provided in the NBER data. 58  Edward E. Learner and Christopher F.  Thornberg 
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industries, 1990 
Source: NBER Productivity database. 
time. This would not affect the observed wage-effort offer curve. What the 
mandated overtime law really does is limit the flexibility of contracts over 
time,  and it affects firms  that  experience  variability  in the demand  for 
labor. Our focus on the longer-run aspects of the contract that are evident 
in the cross-sectional comparison of various industries means that man- A New  Look at the Interindustry Wage Differentials  59 
Table 2.1  Correlations of Weekly Wages and Hours by Four-Digit Industry across 
Sample Years 

















1  .oo 
0.97  1.00 
0.95  0.98 
0.90  0.93 
0.86  0.89 
0.84  0.86 
0.83  0.86 
0.82  0.85 
1 .oo 
0.78  1.00 
0.74  0.85 
0.64  0.74 
0.61  0.64 
0.58  0.59 
0.56  0.61 
0.52  0.62 
Wages Correlation 
1  .oo 
0.95  1.00 
0.91  0.97  1.00 
0.89  0.94  0.97  1.00 
0.88  0.93  0.95  0.97  1.00 
0.87  0.91  0.94  0.96  0.98  1  .oo 
Hours Correlation 
1  .oo 
0.78  1.00 
0.68  0.66  1.00 
0.61  0.63  0.57  1.00 
0.66  0.62  0.60  0.60  1.00 
0.66  0.63  0.61  0.59  0.80  1  .oo 
dated overtime is not a substantial concern. The fact that some industries 
appear consistently to require that their workers work more than 40-hour 
workweeks despite mandated  overtime pay  premiums lends support to 
this idea. 
Our model links weekly hours and weekly wages to capital intensity. 
Table 2.2 reports the average and standard deviation of  real log capital 
per production worker and the average of the percentage  of  employees 
who are production workers for the 448 manufacturing sectors included 
in the sample. The capital intensity for each production worker is mea- 
sured as total industry capital stock divided by the number of production 
workers." The numbers in table 2.2 indicate that the average level of capi- 
tal per production worker has been increasing steadily through the sample 
period,  while  the standard error of  the log has  been  decreasing. This 
growth in capital intensity may be due partly to errors in measurement. 
For example, it is possible that there has been a shift of capital from pro- 
11. This seems to allocate all capital to production  workers, but a weaker assumption 
works. A formula for the total capital is K = koN + kpP,  where Nand P are nonproduction 
and production workers and k indicates the capital intensity of  the job. From this equation 
we  can solve for the capital intensity of the production job as (KIP) = k,(N/P) + k,,. The 
weaker assumption is that the product of nonproduction capital intensity times the nonpro- 
duction share of the workforce kn(NIP)  is adequately constant across sectors. In addition to 
this problem, no attempt is made to allow for differences in depreciation rates across sectors 
and real interest rates over time. 60  Edward E. Learner and Christopher F.  Thornberg 
Table 2.2  Capital per Production Worker 
Average  Standard Deviation  Production 

































Source: NBER database-weight  averages for 448 manufacturing sectors 
duction to nonproduction workers, and it is also possible that the depreci- 
ation rates do not adequately account for obsolescence in this period of 
supposed rapid technological advance. 
2.3.4  Estimation of the Wage-Effort Offer Curve with Four-Digit Data 
To  infer the wage-effort offer curve we  estimate regressions explaining 
weekly hours and weekly wages as quadratic and cubic functions of  the 
ratio of capital (K)  to production employees (PE). 
(7)  log(WeekZyhours), =  +  ' 
(8)  log(Weekly wages),  =  a,  +  P,,L  . log 
We exclude the cubic of capital intensity from the hours equation because 
it is generally statistically insignificant. Data to estimate these equations 
are 3-year averages centered on the years 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 
1985, 1990, and 1993. Observations are weighted by the number of pro- 
duction workers employed in the sector year in order to prevent the small 
sectors from dragging the coefficients around. 
The results of  these regressions are presented  in table 2.3. The basic 
patterns of the results are as predicted and are fairly constant over the 
sample period. Capital intensity explains close to 40 percent of the varia- 
tion in weekly hours across sectors, but somewhat more of the variation Table 2.3  Wage and Hour Regression Results 


















































2.1 184 (0.0783)* 
0.2840  (0.0156)* 
-0.0128  (0.0008)* 
0.4466 
2.0819  (0.0760)* 
0.2890  (0.0150)* 
-0.0127  (0.0007)* 
0.433 
2.2968  (0.0817)* 
0.2337  (0.0157)* 
-0.0097  (0.0008)* 
0.3821 
2.2975  (0.1007)* 
0.2213  (0.0189)* 
-0.0088  (0.0009)* 
0.3835 
2.1802  (0.0994)* 
0.2406  (0.0184)* 
-0.0096  (0.0008)* 
0.3884 
1.9133 (0.1163)* 
0.2821  (0.0210)* 
-0.01  11  (0.0009)* 
0.3212 
2.2617  (0.1266)* 
0.2237  (0.0227)* 
-0.0085  (0.0010)* 
0.2647 
2.2208  (0.1367)* 
0.2351  (0.0244)* 
-0.0091  (0.001  1)* 
0.5031 
8.3832  (2.4432)* 
0.1722  (0.0737)* 
-  1.3892 (0.7386)* 
-0.0061  (0.0024)* 
0.5626 
12.6155 (2.7216)* 
0.3081  (O.OSOl)* 
-2.7023  (0.8125)* 
-0.0107  (0.0026)* 
0.6083 
16.6675 (3.13 lo)* 
0.4073  (0.0868)* 
-3.8122  (0.9069)* 
-0.0135  (0.0028)* 
0.6422 
17.9309 (4.0029)* 
-4.2620  (1.1285)* 
0,4512  (0.1053)* 
-0.0148  (0.0033)* 
0.6731 
15.2499  (4.2042)* 
-3.5119  (1.1691)* 
0.3770  (0.1077)* 
-0.0122  (0.0033)* 
0.6923 
9.7820  (4.3422)* 
-2.0616  (1.1779)* 
0.2481  (0.1059)* 
-0.0084  (0.0032)* 
0.6751 
5.2251  (4.4977) 
-0.7699  (1.2132) 
0.1275  (0.1085) 
-0.0047  (0.0032) 
0.6534 
3.2645  (4.3934) 
0.0651  (0.1050) 
-0.1503  (1.1794) 
-0.0027  (0.0031) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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in weekly wages, 50 percent in  1960 and nearly 70 percent in the 1980s. 
From the pair of estimated equations (7) and (8), we  solve for the wage- 
effort offer curve by eliminating the capital intensity variable. Segments of 
these curves corresponding to observed capital intensities are plotted in 
figures 2.1 1, 2.12, and 2.13. The capital intensity data have a large right 
tail, so the capital range was determined as the minimum capital intensity 
observed  in  the  data up  to  2.5  standard  deviations  above the  mean, 
roughly encompassing all but two outlying sectors of the sample, petro- 
leum refining and blast  furnaces. The lower-left portions of the curves 
represent the wage-effort contracts in the relatively labor intensive sectors, 
while the upper-right portions represent the contracts in capital-intensive 
sectors. The eight regressions are divided into three subperiods in which 
the shift of the curve takes a distinct form: 1960 to 1970, 1970 to 1980, 
and 1980 to 1993. 
The wage-effort offer curves in figure 2.11 for 1960 and 1965 show the 
distinct backward-bending  form of the wage-effort offer curve that was 
evident in the two-digit data in figure 2.7. The lowest curve in figure 2.1 1 
is the wage-effort offer curve in 1960. Between 1960 and 1970, two changes 
appear to be happening. First, the backward-bending portion of the wage- 
effort offer curve has been diminishing, possibly due to the decline in the 
power that unions had to negotiate favorable contracts in the early 1960s. 
In addition, the entire curve has been shifting up and to the right. 
The rightward shift is most evident in the labor-intensive sectors at the 
lower-left portion of the curve. This appears to be due to a relative in- 
32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43 
Hours per Week 
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Table 2.4  Changes in Capital Intensity 
Capital/Production  Change 
Worker, 1960  1960-70 
(1987 dollars)  (%I) 
$0-9,999  56.8 
$10,000-19,999  45.8 
$20,000-29,999  32.5 
$30,000-49,999  30.5 
$50,000+  20.6 
Source: NBER database. 1960-70. 
Table 2.5  Pattern of Capital Deepening from Levels Regressions 
Model  Intercept  Slope 
(K/L)1970on(K/L) 1960  1.705  0.867 
(0.165)  (0.016) 
(K/L)1980on(K/L)1970  0.718  0.964 
(0.160)  (0.015) 
(K/L)1990on(K/L)1980  0.560  0.976 
(0.187)  (0.017) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
crease in  the capital intensity of  these sectors. The average increase in 
capital intensity between 1960 and 1970 was 34 percent according to the 
NBER data. Yet the largest increases occurred among the labor-intensive 
industries, as can be seen in table 2.4, which breaks capital growth down 
by capital intensity in the 1960s. The most capital-intensive industries in- 
creased their capital intensity on average only 20 percent compared to 
over 55 percent in labor-intensive industries. This pattern of change in capi- 
tal intensities is exclusive to the 1960s.  Table 2.5 shows the results from three 
cross-sectional models regressing log capital intensity across industries on 
their values from the previous decade. The pattern of capital deepening 
can be seen in the slope coefficient. If the slope is less than 1,  deepening 
is occurring primarily in the labor-intensive sectors, a slope greater than 1 
implies deepening in the capital-intensive sectors. The slope is significantly 
below 1 in the 1960s, but very nearly 1 in the following 2 decades. These 
changes may be indicative of technological change. They may also be in- 
dicative of the movement of the most labor-intensive subsectors offshore. 
The 1970s were very different from the 1960s. Figure 2.12 compares the 
wage-effort offer curves for 1970, 1975, and 1980. The backward-bending 
portion of the wage-effort offer curve completely disappeared in the 1970s. 
In addition, the wage-effort offer curve twisted, with the low-wage low- 
effort contracts experiencing a 15 percent reduction in wages and the high- 64  Edward E. Learner and Christopher F.  Thornberg 
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Fig. 2.12  Derived wage-effort offer curves, 1970-80 
wage high-effort contracts enjoying a 20 percent increase. The ratio of real 
hourly wages between the two end points of the curve increased from 2.3 
in 1970 to over 3.3 in 1980 and peaked at 3.5 in 1985 before it stabilized at 
about 3.45. We are inclined to associate this twisting of the curve with the 
1970s decline in the relative price of labor-intensive manufactures that is 
documented in Learner (1 998). 
This twisting of the observed wage-effort offer curves is not compatible 
with a representative worker model with a stable utility function, since the 
contracts in the capital-intensive sectors have unambiguously improved 
while  those in the labor-intensive sectors have unambiguously  deterio- 
rated. This twisting of the curve could be an equilibrium if workers have 
heterogeneous preferences. Differences in adversity to effort may also ex- 
plain a portion of the apparent rigidity of the labor market to changes in 
relative wages across sectors: despite the shift in the wage-effort offer curve, 
the distribution of production workers across sectors has remained fairly 
stable. This is illustrated in table 2.6,  which reports employment by quintile 
of capital intensity. The sectors with the lowest capitalAabor ratios experi- 
enced an 8.5 percent reduction in employment between 1970 and 1980.  The 
third and fourth quintiles experienced the greatest gains, while there was ac- 
tually a decline in employment in the most capital-intensive sectors. 
In the 1980s the wage-effort offer curve began to shift to the right, a 
movement that is depicted in figure 2.13. In words, for the same wage 
levels, workers were required to work more hours. The increase in weekly 
hours was between 2 and 3 hours during this 13-year period, more at the 
upper end of the wage-effort offer curve than at the lower end. One pos- A New  Look at the Interindustry Wage Differentials  65 
Table 2.6  Changes in Employment of Production Workers by Quintiles of Capital 
Intensity, 1970-80 
Capital  Employment  Employment  Change 
Intensity  1970 (X lo3)  1980 (X lo3)  (“/I 
First quintile  2,589.9  2,319.4  -8.5 
Second quintile  3,172.6  3,281.6  3.4 
Third quintile  2,619.2  2,771.7  5.7 
Fourth quintile  2,712.9  3,050.4  11.7 
Fifth quintile  2,545.1  2,406.5  -5.6 
Fig. 2.13  Derived wage-effort offer curves, 1980-93 
sible explanation for this shift is the increasing real capital rental costs 
coming from the rise in the demand for capital induced by the economic 
liberalizations in Asia and Latin America. Another possible explanation 
is the introduction of new more expensive equipment (computers and ro- 
bots), which shifts the curve as illustrated in the middle panel of figure 
2.5. A third possibility is the business cycle. There was a four-point decline 
in unemployment after the peak during the recession in 1983. The strong 
correlation between employment and weekly hours was highlighted in fig- 
ure 2.8. Yet there are a number of reasons to doubt the business-cycle role 
in the sharp increase in weekly hours. One reason is the magnitude of the 
change. The larger change in unemployment between 1969 and 1983 (a re- 
duction of 5.5 points) only led to a 1.25-hour decrease in average weekly 
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Fig. 2.14  Benefit to wage costs in manufacturing, 1989 = 100 
Source: BLS Labor Cost Indexes, Manufacturing. 
We think that a likely cause for part of the shift in the wage-effort offer 
curve since 1980 was an increase in the quasi-fixed labor costs emphasized 
by Oi (1 962): training, payroll taxes, and worker benefits. Whether it is cap- 
ital or benefits, firms can save costs paid on a per-worker basis by getting 
more work out of each worker; thus more benefits for more hours. Figure 
2.14 plots the ratio of a BLS employee-benefits index relative to wages per 
worker in manufacturing in the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1996, this index 
increased about 25 percent. Note that  the majority  of this increase oc- 
curred after 1986. Unfortunately, the data do not go back beyond  1979, 
so there is no way to compare this trend to earlier periods. 
2.3.5  Controlling for Business Cycles 
According to our estimates, the wage-effort offer curve has varied sys- 
tematically over time, shifting up, then twisting, and finally shifting right. 
The 1970 and 1980 dates at which we estimate the wage-effort offer curve 
were selected to conform with Learner’s (1998) claim that the 1970s were 
the Stolper-Samuelson decade in which there was a significant decline in 
the relative prices  of labor-intensive tradables.  But these years and the 
other 5-year intervals at which we estimate the wage-effort offer curve select 
different points in the business cycle, and some of the observed shifting may 
be due to the cycle rather than the fundamentals. In this section we show 
that in fact the timing is not essential. Comparisons, peak-to-peak  and 
trough-to-trough, show the same shifting of the wage-effort offer curve. 
We use the employment rate to define the cycle. As is evident in figure 
2.8, weekly hours lead the employment rate, a feature we  attribute to a A New Look at the Interindustry Wage Differentials  67 
delay between an increase or reduction in product demand and the actual 
hiring or firing of workers. To  capture the cycle in demand, we  use the 
smoothed forward rate of employment as the indicator of the business 
cycle, and we compare peak-to-peak and trough-to-trough changes in the 
wage-effort offer curve. Using smoother year-ahead rate of employment 
again as our guide, we set our trough years as 1961-62,1970-71,  1975-76, 
1981-82,  and  1991-92.  The peak  years were  set at  1958-59,  1967-68, 
1972-73,  1977-78,  1988-89,  and 1993-94.  The results of these peak and 
trough regressions are displayed in table 2.7. 
These regressions can be used to solve for the wage-effort offer curves 
such as those displayed in figures 2.1 1-2.13.  When we do so, the peak-to- 
peak and the trough-to-trough comparisons are completely in line with 
our first results, which ignored the business cycle. In the 1960s, the wage- 
effort offer curve moved up and to the right, in the 1970s it twisted, and 
in the 1980s it shifted sharply to the right. In addition, when we put con- 
secutive peak and trough years next to each other, such as 1970, 1971-72, 
1973 and 1977, 1978-81,  1982, we  find very little difference between the 
shapes of these curves. The trends we  see in the wage-effort offer curves 
tend to be long term and appear to occur exogenous to cyclical effects. 
2.3.6  Evaluation of Alternative Explanations 
of the Wage-Effort Offer Curve 
We are excited by  how well these results conform with the theory, but 
we need to be alert to the possibility that these findings are driven by some 
third factor that has nothing to do with effort. Our primary concern is 
that human capital is correlated with physical capital and with hours, and 
that what we are observing is not compensation for effort, but compensa- 
tion for skill and skilled workers choosing longer hours. Unionization is 
also a concern. Unions might be able to bargain for a wage-effort contract 
above the competitive market curve. A strong union effect might account 
for the outlying sectors observed in the two-digit-level data. Even without 
unions, profit sharing may help to explain the pattern of wages. The real- 
ized returns to capital vary widely across sectors and also across time. 
Firms in the less competitive sectors may collect positive rents and may 
share those rents with workers. 
The NBER data set does not include information on unionization  or 
education. We have formed industry estimates of production worker edu- 
cation from the Current Population Surveys. To do this, we had to match 
the 71 three-digit CPS manufacturing industries with the 448 industries in 
the NBER productivity database.I2 Data from Kokkelenberg and Sockell 
(1985) on union status were used for the 1973-81  period while data from 
12. CPS industry data at the three-digit level are available between 1971 and 1994, so the 
1971 data were matched with the earlier NBER data for the regressions. Table 2.7  Wage and Hour Regressions at the Cyclical Peaks and Troughs 
Trough  Peak 















9.03  1 * 































,293  ,359 
2.299*  2.257' 
.219*  .259* 
Wage Regressions 
,674  ,484 
4.197  7.263* 
,095  ,135 
-  .0084*  -.0117* 
-.448  -  1.032 



































-  1.353 
-  ,0064 
,255 
2.190* 
,241  * 





-  ,0024 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. A New Look at the Interindustry Wage Differentials  69 
Hirsch and Macpherson (1993) were used for the later years. These mea- 
sures are also created from the CPS data, so they match with the NBER 
data in the same way that the education measures do. 
Industry rents are particularly difficult to measure. The NBER data pro- 
vide a measure of value added. Theoretically this variable represents em- 
ployee wages; other employee benefits such as social security, which are not 
directly included in the wage  bi11;I3 ex  ante capital-rental costs; industry 
rents, if any; and firm-specific rents that accrue to the owners of the capital: 
(9) 
With the admittedly suspicious assumption that capital-rental rates and 
worker benefit rates are constant across industries, we  can extract from 
value added that which is due to capital intensity and treat the residual as 
rent: 
VA, =  w  . Emp, +  w, . Empz +  r  . Capitali +  Rent, +  p,[. 
VA, - w.  Emp,  Capital 
=  a+  p'-  +  Ei. 
EmP,  EmP 
The coefficient CY  represents the per-worker cost of nonwage benefits plus 
average rents, p represents the capital-rental costs, and E is the rent residual. 
Since it is impossible to separate from the constant that part which repre- 
sents average rents, we use only the estimated rent residuals smoothed over 
seven periods to form estimates of sectoral long-run rents.14 
Table 2.8 reports a number of basic statistics for the additional data. 
The average education level for production workers was slightly less than 
12 years in 1993, up from only 10 years in 1960. There are distinct differ- 
ences in the educational attainment of workers across sectors. In 1990 the 
average years of schooling varied across sectors from 9 years to 13.5 years. 
Around 20 percent of production workers were actively enrolled in unions 
or covered by a union contract in 1993, a significant decrease from the 42 
percent enrollment in 1960. Again there appears to be a fairly large varia- 
tion in union participation across sectors, with a maximum of 60 percent 
to a minimum of 2 percent in 1993. In 1960 this range stretched between 
12 percent and 82 percent. The bottom of table 2.8 provides basic statistics 
on the computed industry rents. Note that these data have been converted 
to real values by dividing by the producer price index (PPI) deflator. The 
average rent is close to zero in each period, a function of the regression 
technique employed to  construct  this measure. Interestingly, there has 
been a sharp increase in the variance of rents since 1980. 
Except for the percentages of unionization rate and females, all these 
13. The wage data in the NBER data do not include some worker benefits. 
14. For the purpose of the regression analysis, rents were also put into log form by taking 
the log of 100 times the absolute value and multiplying by the sign of the initial value. Values 
between 0.01 and -0.01  were set to 0. Table 2.8  Additional Explanatory Variables for Wage and Hour Regressions Computed per Production Worker 
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variables will be entered into our equation in logarithmic form. Table 2.9 
reports the correlations between different variables within a data set and 
also between the same variables from the CPS data and the NBER data. 
The correlation between average weekly hours and average weekly wages 
across the two data sets are respectively 0.55 and 0.75, implying that the 
patterns seen in the NBER data are in part replicated in the CPS data 
despite the large differences in the collection techniques employed by the 
two sources. 
Of the other variables, education appears to be significantly correlated 
with both wages and hours. Not surprisingly, educated workers are also 
overrepresented in capital-intensive sectors. Unionization is highly cor- 
related with wages and positively correlated, albeit weakly, with weekly 
hours. This surprising result may be linked to the high positive correlation 
between union activity and the capital intensity of the industry. Rents are 
also positively correlated with capital intensity. These correlations make it 
possible that what we are seeing in the initial set of wage and hour regres- 
sions is only omitted variable bias and not a wage-effort offer curve. These 
new variables will now be included in another set of regressions. 
Although the percentage of females is reported in table 2.9, we exclude 
this from our equations because we  think it represents, at least partly, the 
supply side. Proper econometric estimation of the joint (supply and de- 
mand) determination of  the wage-effort offer curve with heterogeneous 
workers is beyond the scope of this paper. The data do  indicate that females 
tend to be employed in labor-intensive (i.e., low-wage low-effort) sectors. 
Proper treatment of the human capital variable is another delicate task, 
which has been discussed more fully in Learner (1999). Here we note that 
the model depicted in figure 2.1 is based on the assumptions that workers 
are fully charged for the capital they use and that the wage we  observe is 
total earnings net of all capital charges. To put it another way, we assume 
that workers do not bring their own tools to the workplace, and we assume 
also that workers have no other sources of wealth that can be used  to 
finance consumption. Both of these assumptions are violated by human 
capital, first because the wage that we  observe is not net of the implicit 
human capital rental  and second because human capital acquired 
in formal education is partly financed by the government and by the work- 
er’s parents. Without these two problems, we  could simply combine hu- 
man and physical capital into a single capital aggregate. 
This is illustrated in figure 2.15, which depicts three different jobs with 
differing fixed levels of human capital inputs and the same fixed level of 
physical capital inputs. One job uses physical capital only, the second job 
15. An exception is firm-specific training, financed by the firm. The education variable we 
use merely counts the years of formal schooling, those that create human capital owned by 
the worker, not the firm. Table 2.9  CPS and NBER Data Correlation Statistics (1990 data) 
Hhr  WW  KE  Chrs  CWW  Edu  Uni  Rent  Fern 
NBER Data 
Hhr  1  .oo 
WW  0.57 
KE  0.54 
CPS Data 
Chrs  0.55 
CWW  0.45 
Edu  0.35 
Uni  0.23 
Rent  -0.01 
Fern  -0.39 
1  .oo 
0.81  1  .oo 
0.55  0.38  1  .oo 
0.75  0.55  0.66  1  .oo 
0.67  0.49  0.62  0.83  1.00 
0.51  0.33  0.40  0.67  0.19  1  .oo 
0.26  0.34  -0.05  0.19  0.22  -0.02  1  .oo 
-0.47  -0.38  -0.80  -0.75  -0.40  -0.39  0.07  1  .oo 
Note: Correlations computed with all variables in log form. 
Abbreviations: Chrs, CPS hours per week; CWW, CPS wage per week; Edu, education; Fern, female; Hhrs, NBER hours per week; KE, capital; Rent, rents; 
Uni, Union; WW, NBER wage per week. A New Look at the Interindustry Wage Differentials  73 
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Fig. 2.15  Wage-effort offer curves by level of education 
uses the same physical capital but also self-financed human capital, and 
the third job is the same as the second except that the human capital is 
provided without cost to the worker. The envelope of preferred contracts 
without free education is the heavy wage-effort offer curve in figure 2.15, 
which has the same character as the wage-effort offer curves that we have 
been discussing-namely,  the high-effort high-(net) wage contracts are in- 
tensive in human capital. If the human capital is provided free of charge, 
then the offer line facing the educated worker has the slope of the original 
educated worker line but the intercept of the no-education line. This line 
of contracts with free education completely dominates the contracts if ed- 
ucation is charged to the workers.'6 
Empirically, there are a number of directions in which this discussion 
of education could lead. One is nowhere. If education is free and everyone 
has the same ability, then the regressions of wages and hours on capital 
16. As a side note, this resulting equilibrium suffers from two kinds of inefficiencies, too 
much education and too little effort. It is efficient to have some workers operating without 
human capital investments, but, once it is free, everyone opts for the education. It is efficient 
to have educated workers supplying a high level of effort, but the wealth transfer to them in 
the form of free human capital affords them the opportunity to take it easy and still earn 
high wages. The economic inefficiency here is not caused simply by  some workers opting to 
take it easy. The inefficiency is caused by  workers taking it easy while they use expensive 
capital. This inefficiency would not occur if human capital were transferable among workers. 
For example, if the wealth transfer to workers were financial or physical capital, then these 
wealthy workers could efficiently opt to supply low levels of effort, but they would then take 
jobs that did not require much capital. 74  Edward E. Learner and Christopher F.  Thornberg 
intensity define the wage-effort offer curve. It may be that the educational 
requirements vary along the curve, but that is entirely immaterial because 
workers do not incur a cost for the education. If education is free, but abil- 
ity is heterogeneous (and unobservable) and interacts with education, then 
we are in a lot of trouble and do not want to talk about it. If human capital 
is self-financed, then ideally we  would  amend equations (7) and (8) by 
aggregating human with physical capital and by  subtracting from weekly 
wages a term that is proportional  to human capital and that represents 
the human capital rental charges. We do not know how to aggregate years 
of education with dollars of physical capital and we do not know the im- 
plicit rental rate of human capital to net from wages. What we  do is add 
the human capital variable to our equations and hope for the best, recog- 
nizing that our wage equation is gross of human capital rental charges but 
net of physical capital rent. We plan on revisiting the issues of educational 
financing and heterogeneity in ability in subsequent work. 
Keeping all these concerns in mind, the wage and hour regressions are 
reestimated using the same functional forms as before, but with three new 
variables: the percentage of employees with union status, the log of aver- 
age education, and the measure of industry rents. The variable for percent- 
age of females was not included in these regressions, as we  believe that 
this is a supply-side rather than a demand-side variable. Also included 
were two interactive variables, between union status and capital intensity 
and between industry rents and capital intensity. These interaction terms 
allow for the greater market power that employees may have in capital- 
intensive industries. The inclusion of  the interactive term between educa- 
tion and capital made the results highly unstable and increased the stan- 
dard errors significantly; thus it was dropped from the regressions. 
We draw your attention to the set of supplemental regressions presented 
in table 2.10. The adjusted RZ  for each of the regressions has increased, al- 
though more so for the wage regressions than the hours regressions. The 
signs on the  additional variables in  the wage regression are mostly as 
would be expected, and mostly significant. The capital-intensity variable 
has retained a significant positive impact on both hours and wages despite 
the inclusion of the other variables, including education. When we include 
the interactive coefficients, the magnitudes are quite similar to those of the 
initial regressions, although additional formal analysis will be performed 
to verify this. 
The average education of production workers has a significant effect on 
average weekly wages that increases over time. There was a particularly 
sharp rise between 1980 and 1985, a result that conforms to the literature 
on changes in the returns to education over this period. Holding all else 
equal, the average relative wage difference between a worker with 2 years 
of college and a high school dropout with 10 years of education increased 
from 31 percent in 1970 to 39 percent in  1980 to 55 percent in 1985, and Table 2.10  Supplementary Log Wage and Log Hour Regressions 
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then dropped back slightly to 48 percent in 1993. Interestingly, at the same 
time there was also a substantial change in the impact of education on ef- 
fort. In 1970 the worker with 14 years of education worked on average 1.5 
hours less than the high school dropout. By  1993 this had reversed, so that 
the college educated worked  1 hour more per week on average than the 
high school dropout. This empirical fact sets us to thinking about possible 
explanations.  One explanation we  like is that new very productive jobs 
emerged in the 1980s that required both high amounts of human capital 
and high inputs of physical capital (computers). But maybe it is the decline 
in the marginal tax rates,  or the increasing cost of higher education, or 
something else entirely. Work is under way to answer this important ques- 
tion: Why are the educated working so much harder today than they did 
30 years ago? 
The interactive terms make it difficult to clearly see the impact of rents 
and union status on wages and hours. To facilitate the discussion of these 
interaction terms, table 2.11 displays the estimated impact of a 1 percent 
increase in union participation and in industry rents separately for a labor- 
intensive industry and a capital-intensive industry.”  The impact of union 
status on weekly hours is very small in magnitude, but its impact on wages 
is significant. Not surprisingly, the presence of unions tends to raise wages 
in the capital-intensive sectors more than in the labor-intensive sectors. 
But up until  1985, unions seemed to have a negative effect on wages in 
labor-intensive industries. This result is possibly caused by another poten- 
tial endogeneity problem, this time between capital intensity and unions. 
When unions successfully raise wages, firms naturally become more capi- 
tal intensive. The overall decline of union  presence from 39  percent  in 
1975 to 20 percent in 1993 may explain why this odd result has dissipated. 
Another interpretation is that unions seek preferred contracts in terms of 
both wages and effort level. In the capital-intensive sectors, where the cost 
of cutting effort is very high, unions opt for higher wages and perhaps not 
much change in effort. In the labor-intensive sectors, unions pursue the 
effort dimension of the contract more aggressively and end up opting for a 
contract that has greatly reduced effort and also somewhat reduced wages. 
(Here we are speaking about effort in the form of pace rather than in the 
total number of hours.) 
We are uncomfortable with both the theory of rent sharing and also our 
measurement  of rents, and we  consequently do not place a great deal of 
faith in the rent results in table 2.11. According to these estimates, industry 
rents seem to reduce hours in labor-intensive sectors, but raise hours in 
capital-intensive sectors. Rents have a mixed effect over time  on wages 
in the labor-intensive sectors, but consistently raise wages in the capital- 
17. These industries are defined at the minimum and maximum levels of capital intensity 
for each time period, respectively. A New Look at the Interindustry Wage Differentials  77 
Table 2.11  Variation in Union and Rents Effects (YO) 
Hours  Wages 
Low  Average  High  Low  Average  High  Variable 
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Nore: Impact of a 1 percent increase in rents and union status on weekly hours and wages 
by capital intensity. 
intensive sectors, reflecting the potential for profit sharing within an indus- 
try that is not fully competitive. 
The point of this lengthy discussion of additional variables is primarily 
to determine if our initial estimate of the wage-effort offer curve is substan- 
tially contaminated by  the omission of all these effects. Since we  are now 
treating human capital as self-financed, in principle we  want to trace out 
the wage-effort offer curve after aggregating human and physical capital 
and after removing from wages the implicit rental cost of human capital. 
This is not easily done, and what we do instead is to trace out the curve in 
the same way as before, using the new coefficients on the capital-intensity 
variables and holding fixed all the other variables at their sample averages. 
The results are displayed in figure 2.16. Although the shape of the wage- 
effort offer curves is altered slightly, the same basic patterns of change can 
be seen in the three periods. 
2.4  Conclusion 
We  have provided in this paper substantial evidence that the U.S. la- 
bor market offers a set of wage-effort contracts, with effort measured by 
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Fig. 2.16  Derived wage-effort offer curves, 1960-93,  controlling for education, 
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industry-level data. One equation explains wages as a function of capital 
intensity and the other equation explains hours also as a function of capi- 
tal intensity. By eliminating capital intensity from these two equations, we 
form a wage-hour offer curve. 
We  have found that this offer curve shifts in three distinctly different 
ways. Between 1960 and 1970, the wage-effort offer curve shifted up, with 
higher wages offered at every level of effort. Between 1970 and 1980, the 
wage-effort offer curve twisted, with the best contracts getting better and 
the worst contracts getting worse. Since the 1980s, the wage-effort offer 
curve has shifted to the right,  requiring more effort for the same wage 
level. The upward shift in the 1960s is consistent with capital deepening, 
the twisting in the 1970s with price declines of labor-intensive tradables, 
and the rightward shift after 1980 either with the introduction of new equip- 
ment or with increases in government-mandated benefits. 
The weakest link in our empirical analysis is probably the use of hours 
as a measure of effort. Despite problems with hours as a measure of effort, 
we  find a consistent  and significant  relationship among wages, effort as 
measured by hours, and capital intensity. This relationship stands up even 
when we control for the business cycle, education, unionization, and esti- 
mated industry rents. 
This is, of course, not the end of the story by any means. We should be 
studying tasks,  not industries. We  should be looking  at individual-level 
data and data outside of manufacturing.  We  should be allowing more 
completely for heterogeneity in ability and tastes. We should have a better 
measure of unionization.  We should explicitly link changes in the wage- 
effort offer curve to the fundamental drivers such as globalization, techno- 
logical change, and worker benefits. Most of all, we need a better measure 
of effort. 
Although this is not the end of the story, it is a very good beginning. 
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Comment  Alan V.  Deardorff 
This paper follows up another paper of Learner’s alone (Learner  1999) 
that I have had the pleasure of discussing twice on other occasions. I’ve 
said before, and I will  repeat here, that I very much like the theoretical 
model. It adds a dimension-effort-to  the two-sector production model 
that yields a surprising list of interesting and plausible implications. These 
implications are at least consistent with a number of stylized facts, includ- 
ing the relationship across industries between wages and capital intensity 
that Learner documents empirically in his earlier paper. 
This paper goes a few steps further toward estimating (“estimate, don’t 
test”) the model empirically, primarily by measuring effort by observable 
hours of  work  and asking whether  the combined  relationships  among 
hours, wages, and capital intensity are consistent with the model. To a con- 
siderable (and, to me, surprising) extent, they are. Furthermore,  by  re- 
peating the empirical analysis eight times at 5-year intervals since 1960, 
Learner  and Thornberg  are able to observe how  this  relationship  has 
changed over time in ways that are at least in some cases consistent with 
what one would have expected from the model in response to, first, capital 
accumulation and, then, globalization. The findings are striking and they 
do, as intended, lend even greater credibility to the model. I can see noth- 
ing particularly wrong with what they do, and on the contrary I am im- 
pressed with the way  they anticipated many of my  concerns with addi- 
tional regressions controlling for variables that they initially left out. 
My comments, then, will be mostly requests for amplification and ex- 
tension, as is customary for a discussant who does not actually have to do 
the work. I have five of these to mention, after which I will ask whether 
there may not be some other explanation for the patterns that they have 
found in the data. 
This paper, like Learner (1999), assumes fixed-coefficient technologies. 
That was fine for making the theoretical points in the earlier paper, but as 
the basis for an empirical analysis it raises the question of whether factor 
substitution could alter the story in ways that matter. I suspect the answer 
is no, but I’d  like to see it addressed. I presume that factor substitution 
would cause what are now linear zero-profit constraints to become nonlin- 
ear. But in my  own thinking,  I have been unable to visualize how they 
would curve, and I wonder whether they could curve in such a way as to 
cross one another more than once. I presume  that, if  one had factor- 
intensity reversals in the more usual isoquant diagram, that would happen. 
For a given set of prices, it would probably not matter if  they did cross 
more than once. An industry’s zero-profit curve would be part of the enve- 
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lope for all industries only in one place, most likely. But as things change 
over time, where the curve hits the envelope might change and we could 
see the ordering of industries by capital intensity change. The remarkable 
charts in figure 2.7 suggest that this did not happen, but if one does allow 
for factor-intensity  reversals  as I’ve suggested,  this becomes that much 
more surprising. 
A related issue is that the theoretical model never allows for more than 
two goods, yet the empirical work, of course, includes many. I do  not think 
that having multiple goods would change the story here at all, but it would 
somewhat change the emphasis. As told here, the story of a change in, say, 
relative prices seems to be mostly about how the zero-profit curves of the 
two industries shift and rotate, leading to shifts and, as they put it, twisting 
of the offer curve. But with many goods, it becomes clear that what mat- 
ters most is not really the shape of the industry curves at all. In market 
equilibrium  these must  all  be  tangent  to a  single worker’s indifference 
curve. Thus it is the indifference curves that ultimately constitute the offer 
curve, and that is where one should look to understand  changes in its 
shape. 
This makes it easier, I think,  to understand  the twisting  of the offer 
curve that Learner and Thornberg attribute to relative price changes. As 
they explain with figure 2.4, twisting is a rather mysterious phenomenon 
that includes changes in the curve’s slope in opposite directions in different 
places.  But what  has really happened  is that  changes in relative prices 
have moved workers to a lower indifference curve, and the new offer curve 
reflects its shape entirely. With Learner’s assumed form for the utility func- 
tion, which includes a maximum level of effort, lower indifference curves 
are squeezed down toward the corner formed by the horizontal axis and 
this maximum, and they do indeed become flatter along their bottom por- 
tions and steeper further up. 
The one place where the data do not seem to conform to the model is 
in the backward-bending  shape of this  offer curve. If  it really were an 
indifference curve, as it should be from the model, then it could not look 
like this, since presumably workers are unambiguously better off working 
fewer hours for more (total) pay. Learner and Thornberg attribute the back- 
ward bend to the presence of unions, although as far as I can see, account- 
ing for unions in their regressions does not remove this feature. And while 
1 do  understand the intuition that unions in some sectors might both raise 
wages and reduce hours, I am uncomfortable with the disconnection be- 
tween this suggestion and the treatment of unions in Learner’s earlier pa- 
per. One of the nice features of that model was its treatment of collective 
bargaining,  and I cannot see that  it looked anything like this.  I  would 
prefer to see unions handled in a way that we know to be at least consistent 
with the model. 
Another concern that I  have is the employment  of workers  in shifts. A New Look at the Interindustry Wage Differentials  83 
This issue is mentioned repeatedly in the paper, mainly to acknowledge its 
importance and the difficulty of addressing it. I agree with both, as well 
as with the suggestion that their findings are all that much more impressive 
given that they did not deal with it. That is, the true capital intensity of an 
industry is probably the ratio of capital to labor that needs to be employed 
simultaneously, not the ratio that may in fact be employed over a week. If 
a machine requires one worker to operate it, then the correct ratio is one 
machine per worker, even if shift operation permits it to run continuously 
over a week with three or four workers in staggered shifts. Thus the mea- 
sured capital/labor ratios in these industries may not correctly reflect dif- 
ferences in these true capital/labor ratios if shift operations are feasible in 
some and not feasible in others. Learner and Thornberg’s response to this 
is to say, Yes, that’s right, so isn’t it impressive that we get the results that 
we do, even with such noisy data on capital/labor ratios. I agree. 
But I also wonder if shifts could not also account for one of their find- 
ings that they find difficult to explain, namely the backward-bending offer 
curve. As Frank Stafford and I (Deardorff and Stafford 1976) argued years 
ago, as industries become more capital intensive, they first reconcile the 
conflicting desires of labor to get some sleep and of capital to work 24 
hours a day by gradually lengthening the workday, exactly as Learner and 
Thornberg find. But at some point the costs of this compromise become 
too great, and it becomes cheaper to add shifts and reduce hours, even 
though the less-popular shifts require greater pay. Is it not possible that 
Learner and Thornberg’s backward-bending offer curve just reflects that 
the most  capital-intensive  industries  are doing  exactly that-reducing 
hours but adding shifts? Shifts, then, together with the story that Frank 
and I told years ago about balancing the interests of labor and capital, 
may provide another alternative explanation for Learner and Thornberg’s 
findings that they have not addressed. 
Which brings me to my final point. As I thought about their findings 
and wondered where they might have come from, I did not at first think 
of the shift explanation that I have just mentioned. Rather, as I looked at 
figure  2.7 and  heard  it  described  as  showing backward-bending  offer 
curves, I could not help but think I was seeing backward-bending labor- 
supply curves. The trouble with that, however, is that you do not expect 
to see all the points on a labor-supply curve at once. With only one wage 
paid, you will only observe one point, and if  more than one wage were 
paid, workers would all take the highest. But if workers are not the same 
in all industries in terms of their productivities, but are the same in terms 
of their willingness to trade off labor and leisure, then one might observe 
exactly this pattern of low-wage workers working short hours, medium- 
wage workers working a bit more, and high-wage workers working a bit 
less. 
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already allow for the possibility of differences in education, and the back- 
ward bend does not go away when they control for that. But suppose that 
workers differ in other ways that are not fully captured by education? Sup- 
pose that they are differently endowed with innate abilities, and that these 
abilities are complementary with physical capital. Then capital-intensive 
industries will attract these workers by paying them more, and they in turn 
will select their hours worked in  accord with their preferences. This, it 
seems to me, would account for the backward-bending pattern of the data, 
but with a much different interpretation of what it represents. Most impor- 
tantly, it would not then be the case that all those dots in a panel of figure 
2.7 represent workers at the same level of utility, or that workers are indif- 
ferent between employment in transport or apparel. Instead, we would have 
some workers who are meaningfully better off than others, and changes in 
the economy such as globalization  would have real, not just apparent, 
implications for true inequality. 
I suppose that if these differences in innate ability were sufficiently cor- 
related with education, then Learner and Thornberg’s inclusion of educa- 
tion in their later regressions would capture it. But if the correlation is less 
than perfect, would this do the trick? Learner is the econometrician, not 
I, and I’m sure he can answer this. But even if the answer is yes, I suspect 
that there are many differences in  innate ability that are not correlated 
with education, but that do matter for a worker’s productivity in, say, fabri- 
cating metals versus stitching apparel. 
So my bottom line here is that I love the model, and I am very impressed 
and intrigued with the empirical results of this paper. But I am not yet 
ready to believe that this is the main story that we should be telling about 
recent changes in the world economy. In particular, the notion that appar- 
ent increases in inequality are illusory-that  the workers who are earning 
more are not really any better off, but just working harder-strikes  me as 
both doubtful and dangerous. 
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